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Abstract
This paper serves three purposes. First, it gives a short introduction to the concept of sustainability in
relation to land use. Since the Brundtland report it has become clear that sustainability is a dynamic
concept that changes when conditions in society change. Moreover, it is easier to assess what is
'unsustainable' than what is 'sustainable'. But that will not suppress the demand for sustainable
developments. Second, it elucidates a classification of different concepts developed within New
Institutional Economics and applies these concepts to a number of typical problem areas in relation to
land ownership and land use. Institutions change slowly and that holds most for informal rules, which
are classified by Williamson as 'social embeddedness'. Land ownership and land use often function partly
under informal rules. But formal rules and institutional arrangements are also crucial: together with the
informal rules they go here under the name 'institutional setting'. Because the landowner - or the present
user ofland - is often not the best user from the perspective of the society, the relationship between
'owner' and 'user' has raised a lot of attention. Efficient exchange at the land rental market, but also
contracts that are adjusted to the characteristics of owners and renters or to the specifics of multifunctional
land use contribute to sustainable land use. Third, this paper provides the connection between the different
papers of this special issue and shows where they fit into the basic theoretical framework. Most attention
goes to ownership (including property rights), the land rental market and contract choice. Different
functions ofland use, however, are also covered with a clear link to informal rules.
Additional keywords: institutional change, land ownership, land rental market, multifunctional land use,
property rights
Introduction
Land has always been an intriguing production factor, in economics as well as in many
other scientific areas. It is remarkable how different scientific disciplines - but also
different groups in society - have studied land during the course of time. To take only
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one early perspective in economics: 'physiocrats' and 'georgists' considered land as the
only production factor that would generate value (i.e., surplus above production costs)
and could therefore be taxed. Such insights have changed; value creation takes place by
different processes and by any resource, whether physical, human, social or cultural.
Still, land is important for production, location of activities, landscape, biodiversity,
living space, and hence wealth in societies. In many societies, land ownership or
permanent use rights contribute to social security and status.
Sustainability is a more recent concept. Since the Brundtland report (Anon., 1987)
sustainability has drawn a lot of attention in the scientific community and also in
society. In this report, sustainability is described as "the ability of Humanity (....) to
ensure that it meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs". This makes it essentially a
dynamic and uncertain concept, where needs of present generations and uncertain
or unknown needs of future generations have to be balanced. Moreover, it is easier to
characterize what is 'unsustainable' than what is 'sustainable'. It is possible to identify
an 'unsustainable' development by comparing it with a development possessing more
preferred characteristics: to define one is already sufficient. 'Sustainable' also requires
such a comparison - but then with a bunch ofless preferred alternatives. Three aspects
of ,unsustainability' come to the fore: ecological, economic, and social. They are often
called the three dimensions of sustainability. Each has in fact its own dimensions
and bringing them together in one framework - together with man-made capital
- requires the valuation of ecological and social capital by economic standards (Pearce
& Atkinson, 1995; Pezzey, 1997). This is a typical economics solution, which is not
always accepted by other disciplines, which do not appreciate the integration of the
different dimensions into one valuation concept.
Many books and articles have been dedicated to unsustainable land use caused by
erosion, salinity, depletion ofminerals, and pollution, but also by reducing the natural
biodiversity or spoiling the landscape. One cannot deny that these are mainly aspects
of ecologically unsustainable developments. They capture the attention. But economic
and social conditions play an equally important role because ifland use generates
no income or ifnobody cares about cultural landscapes - due to a lack of people or a
social infrastructure - then irreversible and unintended developments (from a societal
perspective) take place at the cost of future generations, and such developments are
characterized as unsustainable. Still, society is demanding sustainable developments.
Moreover, it is useful to observe that unsustainable land use like severe erosion (e.g.,
the Badlands in South Dakota) or digging out peat and creating lakes (e.g., in the
Netherlands) can be highly valuable if tourism becomes more important than agriculture
So under different conditions a previously unsustainable development can become very
attractive. This is another illustration that sustainability is a dynamic concept.
In literature, less attention has been given to institutional causes of unsustainable
land use. Here we consider institutions as general characteristics of societies, which
have a much wider relevance than simply with respect to land use. Institutions are
defined as the informal and formal rules that govern societies. Institutions change
slowly, which implies that when conditions are changing, the institutions are often not
in line with the new conditions. It is crucial for institutions to fit present and future
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needs of society under the (then) ruling ecological conditions.
A special issue like this one cannot cover the whole area of sustainable land use
in relation to institutional settings. We are limited to the size of such an issue and the
new papers available. Still, we tried to have a rather wide perspective with contributions
focusing on western Europe, eastern Europe, North America (USA), South America
(Peru), and Asia (China). This represents a very wide range of institutional settings
(geographically and institutionally).
Good theoretical and empirical approaches to institutions ofland use can be found
in Hayami & Otsuka (1993), Otsuka & Place (ZOOl), Allen & Lueck (zo03), and Otsuka
(zo07). This special issue contributes to the available literature by presenting new
approaches and results. This paper gives the framework for positioning the results of
this ongoing and widening area of scientific research.
Institutions and sustainable land use
Institutions in relation to land use
Although the word 'institutions' is well known, its definition is often problematic. As
can be imagined, institutions are defined in different ways. According to North (1991),
institutions are "the humanly devised constraints that structure policy, economic
and social interaction. They consist ofboth informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws and
property rights)". Over time, people have developed institutions in order to create order
and regularity.
As indicated by North (1991), rules can be formal and informal and this led
Williamson (zooo) to distinguishing informal and formal rules (see Table 1). The
informal rules (~ social embeddedness) are most consistent, because they belong to the
common knowledge and habit formation of people and are often passed down from one
generation to the next: informal land use rights are typical examples in the literature. If
informal rules allow existing footpaths over land, then ownership rights are restricted.
The same applies with respect to groundwater under the land: informal (or formal)
rights to use that water affect opportunities ofland use.
Another distinction within institutions that deserves attention is the difference
between the institutional environment (which are the formal rules of a society) and
the institutional arrangements (also known as governance structures). Institutional
arrangements or governance structures rule the co-ordination mechanisms (Slangen et
a!', zo08) that are crucial for the way in which processes take place in society. Let us
provide a typical example in relation to land use. Ifboth land ownership and land
tenancy are allowed, then the way contracts are arranged between landowners and
tenants is called an institutional arrangement or governance structure. Several
such arrangements exist: markets, contracts, vertical integration (which implies full
co-ordination within a hierarchy) and a whole range of hybrids between markets
and hierarchies. Each of them has its own characteristics, and it depends on the
institutional environment which of them functions best. Williamson (zooo) considers
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Table 1. Four levels of structuring human decision-making with an application to land.
Level Time horizon Core elements
(years)
Examples in relation to land use
II. Institutional IO-IOO Formal rules in the
environment constitution, laws, formal
organization of society.
III. Institutional I-IO Governance structures
arrangements that rule processes and
provide co-ordination.
IV. Resource Continuous Choice of input and
allocation output levels by agents.
I. Social
embeddedness
IOO-IOOO Informal rules of society,
traditions, norms, religion.
Whether land property is
acknowledged; whether individual
or common property rights hold;
whether civilians have access to land.
Land property rights; inheritance;
land tenure law; enforcement
oflaws and regulations.
Land markets; rental markets;
land redistribution; contracts
for the provision oflandscape and nature.
Selling or buying land; renting and
leasing land; crop choice;
fertilization.
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institutional arrangements as more flexible than the institutional environment.
Governance structures often develop in a more incremental way.
Given the presence of informal rules with respect to land use, it is virtually impossible
to apply a governance structure (~institutionalarrangement) that is contrary to basic
informal rules. Moreover, changing formal rules of society (e.g., concerning land ownership
or lease regulation) often takes many years. This implies that social embeddedness and
the institutional environment are determining factors for the institutional arrangements.
There is also a feedback effect ofparticular institutional arrangements being allowed
via laws and regulations. Ifgovernance structures seem to function quite well then they
influence the institutional environment (e.g., by being included in the law) and gradually
also social embeddedness: the informal rules. We summarize a typical combination of
social embeddedness (Table I, level I), institutional environment (level II) and governance
structure (level III) with the name 'institutional setting'.
Institutional settings lead to the actual resource allocation and exchange processes
that take place in society (level IV). It is the subject area covered by e.g. neoclassical
economics: resource use, the exchange of goods and services, price formation, income
generation, and investment decisions. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient
institutions are rapidly replaced by more efficient institutions (North, 1994). This idea,
however, is challenged by New Institutional Economics. Still it is useful to realize that the
results of processes at level IV influence again the institutional setting (Sterman, 2000).
It is obvious that when there is no water available, it will be difficult to irrigate
land. But it seems to be more difficult to grasp the idea that certain types ofland use are
unsustainable if property rights are not clearly defined and ifembeddedness in societies
will not occur. For social scientists, however, that is or becomes increasingly obvious.
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Elaborating institutional settings and their effect on sustainable land use
Institutions are very important for sustainable land use. Here we summarize land use
under two stylized patterns of institutional settings that are typical for a low and a high level
ofdevelopment (Table z). Ofcourse, such patterns could be further detailed or adapted.
Table z could be extended, but shows clearly that the institutional setting also
determines the relevance of particular types of institutions. In the following we
elaborate on each of the items in Table z.
Ownership,use, and transferof rights
From the perspective of societies it is a key issue that land is owned or used by those
who can contribute most to the development of society. Land ownership and land use
are two different concepts. The user right is a right emanating from the bundle of
property rights of ownership (Slangen et a!., zo08). Ownership is most fundamental,
and land use rights are derived from the bundle of property rights that characterize
ownership. Under institutional settings where (almost) permanent user rights exist,
land use rights playa more important role and ownership functions in the background.
Land use rights can be transferred (partly) from owners to users. It is also possible to
transfer user rights fully or partly from one user to the other. Transfers can be done via
markets, but also via enforcement by law and/or by governmental organizations.
Land ownership has many variations, ranging from private ownership to state
ownership, or community ownership and no-ownership (Slangen et a!., zo08). Private
ownership is generally the most desirable institution for sustainable land use because it
ties together the residual control and residual returns, provides individual landowners
with economic incentives to work hard and improve land value, and eventually
generates socially efficient outcomes (Milgrom & Roberts, 199z). However, sustainable
land use may not be achieved when individual land use produces negative externalities
and private ownership creates social inequity.
Individual land rights are restricted under community ownership. User rights are
shared - often on the basis of informal rules. Tenure security and transfer rights of
land are usually restricted by the informal rules in the community (Otsuka & Place,
Table 2. Land use under two stylized institutional settings.
Item
Ownership rights
Land rental market
Contract choice
Different functions
ofland use
Low level of development
Incomplete and partly based on
informal arrangements.
Often poorly functioning; goes
by informal rules of communities
and (limited) formal rules.
Relatively more sharecropping.
Agricultural production-oriented /
partly self-subsistence.
High level of development
Clearly described, but often
restricted by general rules of society.
Rental markets, which are sometimes
adjusted to the need of specialized
contracts.
Mainly cash rent.
Market oriented and sometimes
multifunctional land use.
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2001). Individual land rights under state ownership are even more restricted unless the
state grants clear property rights to individuals (Otsuka & Place, 2001). For sustainable
land use it will be important that the landowner or user cares about keeping the land
in good condition and preparing it for future use. Investment in soil fertility, but also
keeping up irrigation systems and other infrastructure (e.g., those that control erosion)
are essential for the future productivity ofland. From an institutional perspective
this is often guaranteed if tenure security exists. This provides a security level that
allows investment demand and the provision of credit. Under such conditions the
current land user is assured of the revenues of current investments and future land
use (Besley, 1995). But implementing secure user rights counteracts allocating land to
the most efficient user, and hence to long-term sustainability effects. One observes an
interesting trade-off here.
Land rental market
Markets are the key economic mechanisms for efficient resource allocation and
economic growth. Under institutional settings where imperfections exist in markets for
credit and insurance (low level of development, specified in Table 2), transfers ofland
use rights usually take place through the land rental market. For sustainable land use it
will be desirable for the land to be transferred from less productive to more productive
producers. Equalizing the marginal product ofland across producers with different
land-labour endowments is essential for efficient and equitable land allocation and
for productivity growth in agriculture. From an institutional perspective this is often
guaranteed if free land transfer rights are provided (Carter & Yao, 1999).
Contract choice between landowner and tenant
The relationship between landowner (or the one who leases land) and the tenant has
been one of the popular items in research. Many articles start from a principal-agent
approach (Huffman & Just, 2004). Crucial assumptions are related to asymmetric
information between owner and renter: they have access to different information.
This makes it difficult for the landowner to select the best renter: this is often called
the 'adverse selection problem'. But if the renter has been selected, then the problem
arises of providing the 'right' incentives to keep land in good condition: often called the
'moral hazard problem'.
Given that farming depends on weather and market conditions, there is a lot of
uncertainty involved in these two problems, and the risk-averseness of owner and
renter may also differ. This leads to an interesting set of opportunities, where the
optimal selection of the renter and the elements of the contract depend not only on
individual characteristics of owner and renter but also on the opportunities to transfer
risks to insurance markets or to share risk between owner and renter (sharecropping).
From such a theoretical framework it is possible to derive the consequences of
monitoring and enforceability costs, and differences in risk attitude and risk perception.
It is also possible to explain the dominance of share tenancy under the institutional
settings ofdeveloping countries (e.g., Otsuka & Hayami, 1988; Otsuka et a!., 1992;
Huffman & Just, 2004) whereas fixed cash rent is the main contract in circumstances
where renters have less risk, are relatively difficult to monitor, or have relatively large
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farms and high wealth levels (Huffman & Fukunaga, 2008). This has also been
mentioned in Table 2. Some researchers also provide theoretical explanations as to why
in sharecropping contracts a 50-50 sharing is widely observed in spite of tenant and
landowner heterogeneity (Otsuka et a!., 1992: 1969; Huffman & Just, 2004).
As discussed previously, for sustainable land use it will be good that the landowners
cultivate the land (owner-operators); or the land users enjoy long-term tenure
security (e.g., permanent land users). In the case of fixed cash rent (cash-renters) or
sharecropping (tenant-operators), the tenants do not enjoy long-term tenure security.
Therefore, the incentives for land-related investments and sustainable land use may
be weaker with fixed cash rent and sharecropping than with land ownership. However,
long-term share tenancy based on personal trust gives the tenant strong incentives
for land-attached investments and the landowner is involved in production decision-
making so that he can incorporate his long-term interests in agricultural production.
So the incentives for sustainable land use may be stronger with share tenancy than
with fixed cash rent. The standard principal-agent approach assumes that it is possible
to conclude complete contracts.
Differentfunctionsof land use and the relatedcontracting
Under the institutional settings of developed countries, different functions ofland
use become increasingly important (e.g., Pedroli et a!., 2007; Jongeneel et a!., 2008).
Multifunctional land use means that land use can simultaneously fulfil different
combinations of functions, including the traditional production function (food, feed,
fuel), an ecological function (habitat for wildlife), a cultural function (typical landscapes)
and a recreational function (enjoying landscape, on-farm attractions and accommodation)
(Jongeneel et a!., 2008). This raises the question as to what institutions can best govern
processes of multifunctional land use and develop solutions for sustainable land use.
In practice one can observe that contracting, either of processes or outputs, is
gaining in importance. Contracting landscape services might be easier under full
ownership ofland. Full ownership implies that the decision-maker not only receives
the revenue from the services provided, but also experiences the change in value due
to multifunctional land use. Moreover, it prevents a possible costly monitoring process
of the relationship between land use and land value. Also the results of investment
in knowledge and reputation building in different directions come into the hands of
the one who is investing. MacLeod (2003) shows that if contracts are renewable and
multi-tasking is important, subjective evaluations - and hence incomplete contracts
based on reputation - are frequently better than objective evaluations and very specific
contracts. Such insights can be used in designing contracts for farming in combination
with green services. The flexibility created within an incomplete contract approach is
contrary to the rigidity of a principal-agent approach.
How the set of papers deals with sustainable land use
under different institutional settings
The first paper takes a broad perspective in the number of countries and looks first at
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the institutional environment. The change of formal rules implies a shift from state
and co-operative ownership of farms to more individual farm ownership and land
use. The paper quantifies the influence of a change of institutional environment on
agricultural productivity growth (Rizov, zo08; this issue). This is done for one of the
very interesting 'laboratories' of institutional reform: the former communist countries
in East Europe. Just because the institutional environment changed quickly in these
countries, but at different speeds, the relationship between agricultural productivity
growth and the institutional environment can be tested quite well by means of a
comparative analysis. The paper builds on earlier papers (Rizov, zooS; Lerman &
Shagaida, zo07), but is now focused much more on institutional aspects. Rizov
(zo08; this issue) shows the importance of the institutional environment, but also of
the institutional arrangements in achieving efficient, and consequently also a more
sustainable agriculture. In countries where institutional reforms were implemented
more quickly and/or were further-reaching, the productivity growth was faster, thereby
contributing to sustainable land use.
Land titling programmes are generally considered as an important institutional
reform for enhancing farmer's incentives to make land-attached investments and
to promote sustainable land use. Based on empirical data collected in zo04 from
ZZ30 farmers distributed over five different regional domains in the coastal and
Andean Regions of Peru, Fort (zo08; this issue) investigates the effect ofland titling
programmes, mainly concentrating on the formalization of previous informal land
rights, and on land-attached investments. He shows the importance ofland titling
programmes on the propensity to invest. On parcels with previously low levels of
tenure security, the land-attached investment is higher, which often - and particularly
in developing countries - implies a more sustainable land use.
The development ofland rental and labour markets plays a very important role in
increasing household investment incentives and increasing allocative efficiency and
agricultural productivity (Deininger & Jin, zooS). Earlier literature on land and labour
market development and agricultural production in rural China has focused on either
the land or the labour market. However, empirical evidence shows that economic
reforms in rural China have led to the emergence ofland and labour markets. The
increasing importance of these two markets suggests that they might be closely inter-
related. Based on the data from a household survey held in zooo in three villages in
the northeast of the Jiangxi Province, Feng & Heerink (zo08; this issue) examine the
factors that determine the participation of farm households in land rental markets and
off-farm employment, and investigate whether participation in land rental markets and
off-farm employment influence each other.
Building on Feng & Heerink (zo08; this issue), the paper of Feng (zo08; this
issue) goes one step further to investigate the technical efficiency in rice production
and examines the effect ofland rental market participation, the resulting land tenure
contracts, and off-farm employment on technical efficiency in rural China. The analysis
is based on a household and plot level survey held in zooo, ZOOl and zo03 in three
villages in the northeast of the Jiangxi Province. Feng (zo08; this issue) shows the
importance ofland rental market participation on technical efficiency. Most plots used
by farmers are the so-called contracted plots distributed directly by the village collective.
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Contracted plots experience high tenure security. Rented plots have less tenure
security, but the farmers who rent land might be more efficient. Empirical analysis
shows that rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted plots, which shows that
the two opposing effects compensate each other. Therefore the development of a land
rental market contributes significantly to sustainable agricultural production and hence
land use in rural China.
Cash rent and sharecropping normally co-exist under different institutional settings.
As discussed in the foregoing, sharecropping is dominant in developing countries
because the risk is shared between landowner and renter. But even in developed
countries with less risky processes, e.g., in the USA, sharecropping still accounts for one-
quarter ofall leases (Huffman & Fukunaga, 2008; this issue). Earlier articles ignored
the landlord's attributes as determinants of choosing either a cash rent contract or a
sharecropping contract. Both Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) and Fukunaga &
Huffman (2008) use a uniquely constructed data set of44,515 landlord-tenant contracts
to examine the effect of risk-related factors, transaction cost factors, and landlord's and
tenant's attributes on landlord-tenant contract choice. This implies that quantitative
results are available to determine the effects ofvariables that are typical of an institutional
economics approach. Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) show the importance of
sharecropping for sustainable land use, compared with cash rent.
Where Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) are focusing on landlord-tenant
attributes and a limited number of different contracts, Slangen & Polman (2008; this
issue) focus on different sets of property rights that are transferred from owners to
tenants. Characteristics of owners and tenants do not receive special attention, but
the type of contractual agreement plays an important role. The empirical analysis
is directed at the perspective of the landowner. What is the value of the bundle of
property rights transferred to the tenant? Empirical results confirm that the value of
lease contracts for the landowners depends on the content of the bundle of property
rights: the more control rights for the landowner, the less protection for the tenant, the
shorter the duration of the contract, the higher the flexibility of the contract, the higher
the level of property rights transferability, and the higher the value of the bundle of
property rights for the landowner. The bundle of property rights transferred within a
lease transaction varies with the type of contractual arrangement (Slangen & Polman,
2008; this issue).
Institutional design of agri-environmental contracts is a rather new phenomenon
in the European Union. It is a step towards a more environmentally friendly way of
farming. Earlier articles focused on the role of the farm and farmer characteristics
as determinants of taking up agri-environmental schemes. Also Polman & Slangen
(2008; this issue) include these characteristics in their analysis, but their focus is more
on the institutional design and the role of trust and social capital in taking up agri-
environmental schemes. The analysis is based on empirical data from an EU project
comprising responses from 990 farmers in different EU countries. The data and
the empirical analysis provide excellent opportunities to compare the importance of
institutional settings in relation to multifunctional land use.
Positioning of the different papers in the categorization provided in Tables I and 2
shows clearly that a range of institutional settings and actual resource use is covered,
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Table 3. Positioning of the papers I in the structured level of human decision-making and the main topics
in relation to land use 2.
Topic
Ownership Land rental Contract Different
rights market choice functions of
land use
7
1,2
1,2.,6 3,4,5,6 5,6,7 7
1,2 3,4
III Institutional
Level
arrangements
IV Resource
allocation
environment
I Social
embeddedness
II Institutional
I I: Rizov - Institutional reform; 2: Fort - Land titling; 3: Feng & Heerink - Renting and migration; 4:
Feng - Rental markets; 5: Huffman & Fukunaga - Landlord-tenant contracting; 6: Slangen & Polman -
Land lease contracts; 7: Polman & Slangen - Design agri-environment contracts.
2 Numbers in bold refer to the most important class of 'level' and 'topic' for each paper.
for all the items that playa prominent role in land ownership and land use (Table 3).
Most work, however, is concentrated on institutional arrangements (~ governance
structures) and on the ownership rights and the land rental market. 'contract choice"
and 'different functions ofland use' are also present. Those items will become more
important in developed market economies where green services in rural areas will
receive more attention (see e.g., Diakosavvas, 2004; Anon., 2008), while transition and
developing countries will follow. Multifunctional land use is much more demanding
with respect to institutional settings.
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